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SEPARATION BETWEEN BANKING AND




Thomas E. Wilson *
From the inception of this nation's national banking system, our bank
regulatory legislation steadfastly has maintained a separation between the
business of banking and other forms of commerce.' Except for a brief
period during the first quarter of this century, the activities of banks have
been limited to the deposit-taking and lending functions that have long
characterized the banking business.'
The statutory walls that Congress erected more than 120 years ago to
fence banking away from nonbanking endeavors are today under funda-
mental attack. Large money center banks have been dismayed by the in-
creasing level of competition from near-bank conglomerates such as Sears,
Roebuck & Co. and Prudential-Bache. Likewise, these money center
* Partner, Charles, Karalekas, McCahill & Wilson. J.D., Georgetown University
Law Center, 1967; M.B.A., Columbia University, 1970. Mr. Wilson is a member of the New
York and District of Columbia Bars. Since 1973, Mr. Wilson has been Washington counsel
to the Independent Insurance Agents of America, Inc. (IIAA), a trade association of prop-
erty and casualty insurance agents. For the last decade, IIAA has been at the forefront of
resisting the entry of bank holding companies into the insurance business.
1. See, e.g., National Bank Act, ch. 106, § 8, 13 Stat. 99, 101 (1864) (codified as
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 165 (1982)).
2. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1982). Shortly after the establishment of the national
banking system in 1864, first, state banks, and, later, national banks began establishing affili-
ate relationships with investment banking firms. These relationships occurred in reaction to
the competition from trust companies, unregulated entities that managed the assets of large
estates and that increasingly undertook bank-like activities. In 1927, the McFadden Act
ratified what had been occurring in the marketplace for some time by formally authorizing
national banks to engage in investment banking activities. McFadden Act, ch. 191, 44 Stat.
1224 (1927) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 36, 332 (1982)). Aggressive bank specula-
tion in stocks and bonds underwritten by their affiliated investment banking firms was later
identified as one of the principal causes of the stock market crash in 1929 and the Great
Depression that followed. See generally Perkins, The Divorcement of Commercial and In vest-
ment Banking. A History, 88 BANKING L.J. 483 (1971). The pervasive scheme of existing
federal banking regulation was put into place in direct reaction to the economic and social
trauma of the Great Depression. Id
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banks have been frustrated by their inability to persuade Congress to make
significant modifications in federal laws that forbid the intermingling of
banking and commerce. As a result, these banks have looked for loop-
holes in federal statutes that would permit them to undertake previously
proscribed activities, such as insurance underwriting and brokerage, real
estate investment, and securities underwriting.3
In 1983, several large banks proclaimed that they had found a loophole
in federal law that would permit them to undertake a potentially broad
range of nonbanking activities that were previously thought to be off limits
to banking institutions. Those banks relied upon the theory that activities
that may not be pursued by bank holding companies either directly or in-
directly through their national bank or nonbank subsidiaries may be un-
dertaken through state-bank affiliates so long as state law authorizes the
state banks in question to engage in those activities. Additionally, they
argued-again, if state law were to permit it-that an out-of-state bank
holding company could acquire a state bank with "enriched" nonbanking
powers and initiate otherwise prohibited activities on a nationwide scale.
At least three major bank holding companies, Citicorp of New York,
BankAmerica Corporation and First Interstate Bancorp of California, at-
tempted to exploit the alleged state-bank affiliate loophole in federal law
by seeking Federal Reserve Board authority to acquire banks in South Da-
kota, banks that the South Dakota legislature recently empowered to en-
gage "directly or through subsidiaries ...in all facets of the insurance
3. Bankers are not the only ones who have been poring over federal laws trying to
avoid the restrictions against commingling bank and nonbanking activities. Certain insur-
ance companies and securities firms have successfully circumvented some of these restric-
tions. The principal loophole unearthed by nonbanking interests has come to be called the
"nonbank bank" loophole. Under the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, bank holding
companies have limitations placed on the nonbanking activities in which they may engage.
A bank holding company is any entity that owns a bank. A bank is defined as any entity
that accepts demand deposits and makes commercial loans. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c) (1982). If a
bank stops accepting demand deposits or stops making commercial loans, it stops being a
"bank," the ownership of which would bring the entity owning it under the nonbanking
limitations of the Bank Holding Company Act. The definition of "bank," therefore, has
permitted banks to sell off their commercial loan portfolios and to be acquired by insurance
companies and securities firms without rendering the acquiring entities "bank holding com-
panies." As a result of the "nonbank bank" loophole, a number of cross-industry acquisi-
tions have been consummated. In recognition of the reality that the "nonbank bank"
loophole could fundamentally undermine the separation of banking from commerce, the
Federal Reserve Board recently promulgated regulations which expand the definitions of
"deposits" and "commercial loans" in an attempt to expand the universe of entities included
within the Bank Holding Company Act's definition of a "bank." In doing so, the Board has
attempted to narrow as much as possible the "nonbank bank" loophole. See 49 Fed. Reg.
794-824 (1984).
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business."4
On January 5, 1984, the Federal Reserve Board issued a statement an-
nouncing that, because of "present law and expressions of [c]ongressional
intent," it could not approve the proposed Citicorp, BankAmerica, and
First Interstate acquisitions.5 The Board also made it clear that if bank
holding companies are to be authorized to undertake insurance activities
in South Dakota as a result of South Dakota's new law, Congress and not
any given state legislature would need to authorize that action by making
the appropriate adjustments in federal law.6 In the face of that judgment,
rather than deny their South Dakota bank applications outright, the Board
permitted the applicants indefinitely "to suspend the processing of their
applications."7
This article summarizes the insurance authority of banks and bank
holding companies and evaluates the theory, advanced by the bank hold-
ing companies, that bank holding company state-bank affiliates may be
used to circumvent nonbanking restrictions imposed by federal banking
laws.
I. THE INSURANCE AUTHORITY OF BANKS AND BANK HOLDING
COMPANIES
The historical separation between banking and commerce has meant
that banks have not been authorized to engage in most insurance activi-
ties.8 Before 1916, national banks were not permitted to undertake insur-
4. South Dakota Senate Bill 256 (1983). See, e.g., Dakota Approves BankAmerica Unit,
AMERICAN BANKER, Sept. 27, 1983, at 1.
5. FRB Release, Board Statement on Applications to Acquire State- Chartered Banks in
South Dakota, Jan. 6, 1984, at 2. The Board's release, which is comprised of only two and
one-half pages, fails to include a rationale for its "tentative judgment," beyond the reason
that the Board prefers to wait until Congress has acted on the issue.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Typically, state banking laws are silent about the insurance authority of state banks.
Since banks are corporations with limited and specific powers, any failure to confer specific
authority on banks usually has been interpreted to mean that such power is withheld, except
where the activity in question is seen as reasonably incidental to a power that is expressly
conferred. Many states have determined that the sale (as agent) of credit life and credit
disability insurance, special forms of insurance that repay the lender in the event of the
death or disability of the borrower, are reasonably incidental to the business of banking and
are therefore permissible activities for state banks. Some states have expressly forbidden
state banks and even bank holding companies that operate within their borders to engage in
all but a very narrow spectrum of insurance activities. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. ANN., ch. 175,
§ 174E (West Supp. 1983-84); Fla. Stat. § 626.988 (Cum. Supp. 1981). More recently, other
states have considered legislation permitting state-chartered banks to engage in a broad
range of insurance activities: Delaware, WASH. FIN. RErs. 507 (March 14, 1983) (Director
1983]
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ance activities of any kind. In 1916, Congress expressly authorized
national banks to offer unlimited lines of insurance as agents, but not as
underwriters. This authorization applied only to national banks located in
towns having 5,000 or fewer inhabitants.'
The laws that prohibited state and national banks from engaging in
most insurance activities only limited what those banks could do directly
or through subsidiaries. Those laws did not restrict the activities that
could be undertaken by entities that might come to control one or more
banks. After the enactment of the Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall
Act),' ° the principal federal law that reestablished a rigid separation be-
tween banking and commerce in reaction to the economic debacle that
began in 1929, banking and nonbanking enterprises remained relatively
separate until World War II. After the war, however, commercial and in-
dustrial enterprises began with increasing frequency to acquire banks.
Fearing that the commingling of banking and commerce under single cor-
porate control would lead to undue concentration of power and would ul-
timately threaten the safety and soundness of the banking system,
regulators and legislators alike began considering legislation that would
reinvigorate the long-standing separation between banking and nonbank-
ing activities. This legislation restricted the activities of bank holding com-
panies (corporate entities that own or control banks) and brought those
entities under the administrative supervision of federal banking regulators.
After long debate, Congress enacted the Bank Holding Company Act of
1956 (BHC Act).'" The BHC Act severely limited the nonbanking activi-
of Delaware's Development Office indicated that the office would sponsor the Financial
Services Development Act); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 28-1-11-2 (Bums 1973); Iowa, IowA
CODE ANN. § 524.710 (1970); Minnesota, WASH. FIN. REvrS. 1959 (May 2, 1983) (Minne-
sota may amend its laws to permit state-chartered banks to acquire securities and insurance
firms); Wisconsin, WASH. FIN. REPTS. 466 (Mar. 7, 1983) (regulations were considered that
permitted state banks to invest in subsidiary corporations including full service insurance
agencies).
9. Congress sought to protect the viability of small rural banks, entities that in 1916
were experiencing difficulties in generating sufficient loan revenues to remain in business.
See, e.g., Saxon v. Georgia Ass'n of Ind. Ins. Agents, 399 F.2d 1010, 1015-16 (5th Cir. 1968)
(quoting 53 CONG. REC. 11,001 (1916)).
More recently, the National Bank Act's "incidental powers" clause, 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1982),
has been construed to permit national banks (as opposed to state banks) to act as agents in
the sale of credit life and credit disability insurance. See Independent Bankers Ass'n v.
Heimann, 613 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cerl. denied, 449 U.S. 823 (1980). More recently
still, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency which regulates national banks, deter-
mined that the incidental powers clause also permits national banks to underwrite credit life
and disability insurance. OCC Release, FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH) § 99,806 (Dec. 23,
1983).
10. 12 U.S.C. § 340-60 (1933).
11. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-511, § 2, 70 Stat. 133 (1956)
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ties of multiple-bank holding companies and brought them under the reg-
ulatory control of the Federal Reserve Board. In 1970, the Act's
restrictions were expanded to include all bank holding companies. 2
The original BHC Act limited the permissible activities of bank holding
companies and their subsidiaries to activities of a financial, fiduciary, or
insurance nature that are so closely related to the business of banking as to
be a proper incident thereto. 3 Under that standard, the Federal Reserve
Board authorized approximately eighteen bank holding companies, mostly
in the Midwest, to undertake property, casualty, and life insurance agency
activities. The Board's decisions rested principally on the fact that rural
banks in the Midwest had historically possessed insurance agency author-
ity.14 As a result, the Board saw those activities as "closely related" to the
business of banking as it had been carried on by the companies in ques-
tion. By contrast, insurance underwriting was forbidden."i
The BHC Act was amended in 1966 and again in 1970.16 The 1970
amendments, among other things, extended the Federal Reserve Board's
jurisdiction from multiple-bank holding companies to include single-bank
holding companies as well. Those amendments also altered the test which
governed the nonbanking activities that bank holding companies could un-
dertake. 17 Specifically, since 1970, bank holding companies have been al-
lowed to engage in banking, managing, or controlling banks. They have
also been allowed to engage in those activities that "closely related" to
banking, in such a way as to be consistent with the public interest.' 8
Under the new standard, the Board authorized bank holding companies
to undertake a broad range of property, casualty, credit life, and credit
disability insurance agency activities. The Board required that such insur-
ance be sold by the bank holding company in a manner bearing a direct
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (1982)); S. REP. No. 1095, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 1
(1955); H.R. REP. No. 609, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1955), reprinted in 1956 U.S. CODE.
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2482.
12. Pub. L. No. 91-607, tit. I, § 101, 84 Stat. 1760 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5519.
13. Pub. L. No. 84-511, § 4(c)(6), 70 Stat. 133 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§ 1843(4)(c)(8) (1982)).
14. See, e.g., First Bank Stock Corp., 45 Fed. Res. Bull. 917 (1959); Bank Shares, Inc,
45 Fed. Res. Bull. 954 (1959). But see General Contract Corp., 44 Fed. Res. Bull. 260
(1958).
15. Transamerica Corp., 43 Fed. Res. Bull. 1014 (1957).
16. Pub. L. No. 89-485, §§ 1-6, 80 Stat. 236, 237 (1966), reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2385; Pub. L. No. 91-607, tit. I, § 101, 84 Stat. 1760 (1970), reprinted in
1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5519.
17. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(4)(c)(8) (1982).
18. Id
1983]
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relationship to extensions of credit or the provision of other financial serv-
ices (e.g., mortgage servicing activities) by bank or bank-related holding
company affiliates. 9 In 1972, the Board also authorized bank holding
companies to form subsidiaries to underwrite credit life and credit disabil-
ity insurance coverages. 2' The underwriting of whole life, and property
and casualty insurance were implicitly forbidden.2'
The Board's interpretation of the insurance authority conferred upon
bank holding companies by the 1970 amendments to the BHC Act resulted
in more than a decade of litigation.22 Although the courts trimmed back
the property and casualty insurance agency activities that could be under-
taken by bank holding companies under the Board's initial rules, oppo-
nents of bank holding company insurance authority remained dissatisfied
with the breadth of bank holding company insurance authority. They
therefore embarked upon a campaign to persuade Congress to amend the
BHC Act expressly to prohibit bank holding companies from engaging in
most insurance activities. That effort culminated in 1982 with the enact-
ment of the Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 (Garn-
St Germain Act).23 Section 601 of the Garn-St Germain Act amended
section 4(c)(8) of the BHC Act by including in that provision a congres-
sional declaration that most insurance activities are not activities that may
lawfully be undertaken by bank holding companies.
24
19. See 36 Fed. Reg. 15,525 (1971) (codified as amended at 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(9) & 12
C.F.R. § 225.128 (1983)).
20. See 37 Fed. Reg. 28,046 (1972) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)(10) & 12 C.F.R.
§ 225.135 (1983)).
21. See Transamerica Corp., 43 Fed. Res. Bull. at 1014; NCNB Corp., 64 Fed. Res.
Bull. 506 (1978), affdsub nom. NCNB Corp. v. Board of Gov., 599 F.2d 609 (4th Cir. 1979).
22. See, e.g., Independent Ins. Agents v. Board of Gov., 658 F.2d 571 (8th Cir.), reh'g
denied, 664 F.2d 177 (1981); Independent Ins. Agents v. Board of Gov., 646 F.2d 868 (4th
Cir. 1981); Florida Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Board of Gov., 591 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1979);
Alabama Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Board of Gov., 533 F.2d 224 (5th Cir. 1976), on reh'g, 558
F.2d 729 (1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978); National Ass'n of Ins. Agents v. Board of
Gov., 489 F.2d 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
23. Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (1982), as amended by S.J. Res. 271, Pub. L. No.
97-457, 96 Stat. 2508 (1983).
24. Section 4(c)(8) authorized the Federal Reserve Board to permit bank holding com-
panies to engage in those nonbanking activities which it determined to be so "closely related
to banking or managing or controlling banks" as to be a proper incident thereto, i.e., in the
public interest. Section 601 amended 4(c)(8) expressly to state that acting as "principal [un-
derwriter] agent, or broker in the sale of insurance" is not "closely related" to banking,
except in certain situations that are enumerated in subsections (A) through (G) of that provi-
sion. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(4)(c)(8) (1982).
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II. REACTION TO SECTION 601 OF THE GARN-ST GERMAIN ACT
Frustrated by Garn-St Germain's imposition of further restrictions on
their insurance authority, major banks decided to find a way to get around
those restrictions.25 For a full understanding of the issue's development, it
is necessary to review the factual background beginning in 1980.
During 1980, Citicorp began looking for ways to escape the adverse
financial impact on its credit card operation caused by New York State's
usury laws.26 In connection with that effort, Citicorp asked public officials
in South Dakota to remove the usury limitations that existed under South
Dakota law, and to authorize out-of-state bank holding companies, like
Citicorp, to acquire banks in South Dakota for the purpose of conducting
credit card operations. In an effort to attract jobs associated with the credit
card operations of major banks, South Dakota accommodated Citicorp's
wishes. Citicorp then acquired a national bank in Sioux Falls, South Da-
kota, and moved a major portion of its nationwide credit card operation
and more than 1,000 jobs to South Dakota. The South Dakota credit card
experience proved to be important in the aftermath of the new insurance
restrictions imposed by Garn-St Germain.
III. THE SOUTH DAKOTA INSURANCE LAW
Almost immediately after the enactment of Garn-St Germain, repre-
sentatives of major bank holding companies again approached South Da-
kota public officials, this time seeking changes in South Dakota law that
would authorize South Dakota banks to undertake unlimited insurance
activities.
On March 4, 1983, South Dakota enacted Senate Bill 256. This new law
explicitly authorized bank holding companies, whose banking subsidiaries
conduct their banking business principally outside of South Dakota, to es-
tablish "a single new [South Dakota] bank" or "acquire all or substantially
all of the shares of a single existing [South Dakota] bank."27 It also ex-
pressly empowered South Dakota banks, "directly or through subsidiaries,
to engage in all facets of the insurance business."28
The principal objective of the new law was to permit major bank hold-
ing companies to circumvent the insurance limitations of Garn-St
Germain and to bring more new jobs to South Dakota. The preamble to
25. See, e.g., Ringer, First Interstate Plans to Acquire South Dakota Bank, AMERICAN
BANKER, Apr. 22, 1983, at 3.
26. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-501 (McKinney 1978) (Usury Law).
27. South Dakota S.B. No. 256 § 2 (1983).
28. Id. at§5.
19831
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the bill expressly states that the purpose of the legislation was to create
jobs for South Dakotans and to generate tax revenues for the state.
29
The bill also limits the banking activities of banks acquired under the
Act in order to assure that those banks are "not likely to attract customers
from the general public in the state to the substantial detriment of existing
banks in the state."30 Similarly, under the new law, if a bank is acquired
in order to conduct insurance activities, "it shall conduct its insurance
business . . . in a manner likely not to attract business from the general
public to the substantial detriment of insurance companies, insurance bro-
kers or insurance agents to the extent of their business in the state."'" Fi-
nally, the bill's preamble not only proclaims that its central purpose is to
circumvent federal law, but also observes that the bill allows "South Da-
kota a unique opportunity to secure needed tax revenues and jobs through
the utilization of the changes' 3 2 in South Dakota banking law.
At least three major bank holding companies, Citicorp of New York,
BankAmerica Corporation, and First Interstate Bancorp of California, ap-
plied to the Board for approval to acquire South Dakota banks in order to
engage in wide ranging insurance operations.33
Through their applications, these banks raised the fundamental legal
question of whether bank holding companies may engage in unrestricted
insurance activities through their state-bank affiliates, if they are permitted
to do so under state law.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE BHC ACT
A. "The Framework for Construing the BHC Act
It is a fundamental principle of statutory construction that statutes are to
29. See generally id at § 1. After the bill was enacted the Insurance Commissioner of
South Dakota publicly expressed skepticism about the number of jobs the law would gener-
ate in South Dakota and was promptly fired by the Governor. See Ringer, New South Da-
kota Law Claims a Victim, AMERICAN BANKER, May 4, 1983, at 2.
30. South Dakota S.B. No. 256, supra note 27, at § 3.
31. Id The meaning of this limitation is cast in doubt by a recent opinion of the South
Dakota Attorney General. The Attorney General states that the provision merely requires
out-of-state bank holding companies that undertake insurance operations through South
Dakota banks to restrain themselves from infusing so much capital into the South Dakota
insurance operations so as to "transform a competitive marketplace into a monopolistic situ-
ation where all or most of the competition has been driven out." Letter from Mark V.
Meierhenry, Attorney General of South Dakota, to Glen F. Rittenbusch, Director of Bank-
ing and Finance of South Dakota (Nov. 3, 1983).
32. South Dakota S.B. No. 256, supra note 4, at § 1.
33. See AMERICAN BANKER, supra note 4, at 1.
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be construed in ways that effectuate congressional intent. The Supreme
Court has stated:
There is, of course, no more persuasive evidence of the purpose
of a statute than words by which the legislature undertook to give
expression to its wishes. Often these words are sufficient in and
of themselves to determine the purpose of the legislation. In such
cases we have followed their plain meaning. When that meaning
has led to absurd or futile results, however, this Court has looked
beyond the words to the purpose of the act. Frequently, however,
even when the plain meaning did not produce absurd results but
merely an unreasonable one 'plainly at variance with the policy
of the legislation as a whole' this Court has followed that pur-
pose, rather than the literal words.34
In other words,
[wjhile the language of the BHC Act may be the starting point
in construing the statute, we may look beyond the plain lan-
guage, !f necessary, to ensure that application of the literal terms
does not destroy the practical operation of the statute."
Consistent with fundamental precepts of statutory construction, the
Board has the responsibility of construing the BHC Act through the
promulgation of regulations that are calculated to carry out the intended
purposes of the BHC Act. In Manhattan General Equipment Co. v. Com-
missioner, the Supreme Court noted:
The power of an administrative officer or board to administer a
federal statute and to prescribe rules and regulations to that end
is not thepower to make law-for no such power can be delegated
by Congress-but the power to adopt regulations to carry into effect
the will of Congress as expressed by the statute. A regulation
which does not do this, but operates to create a rule out of har-
mony with the statute, is a mere nullity.
36
34. United States v. American Trucking Ass'n, 310 U.S. 534, 543 (1940) (footnotes
omitted), quoted in Wilshire Oil Co. of Tex. v. Board of Gov., 668 F.2d 732, 735-36 (3d Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2958 (1982).
35. Wilshire Oil Co. of Tex. v. Board of Gov., 668 F.2d at 735 (emphasis added).
36. Manhattan Gen. Equip. Co. v. Commissioner, 297 U.S. 129, 134 (1936) (emphasis
added). See also United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864, 873 n.12 (1977); Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 214 (1976); Association of Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v.
Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 568 F.2d 478, 484-89 (6th Cir. 1977); Alabama Ass'n of Ins.
Agents v. Board of Gov., 533 F.2d at 249-54, cert. denied, 435 U.S. 904 (1978); National
Courier Ass'n v. Board of Gov., 516 F.2d 1229, 1232-41 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Arnold Tours, Inc.
v. Camp, 472 F.2d 427, 435-36, 438 (1st Cir. 1972).
1983]
Catholic University Law Review
B. The Purpose of the BHC Act
The cornerstone of this nation's bank regulatory legislation has been the
separation between the business of banking and other forms of com-
merce.37 Congress' attempt to keep banking separated from commerce has
required Congress, on repeated occasions, to adjust the statutory frame-
work to patch loopholes that would have had the effect of permitting the
commingling of banking and commerce. Congress' careful and persistent
efforts to preserve the formal separation between banking and commerce is
compelling evidence that Congress has long perceived that the separation
between banking and commerce is a necessary ingredient of a sound
banking system.
38
As originally enacted, the BHC Act regulated only those bank holding
companies owning or controlling more than one bank. Banks and bank
holding companies quickly seized upon the "one-bank bank holding com-
pany loophole" as a means of evading the nonbanking restrictions of the
BHC and Glass-Steagall Acts.
3 9
In 1970, Congress again acted to reinforce its consistent policy of sepa-
rating banking from other forms of commerce. Through the enactment of
the Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, ° Congress made
the BHC Act applicable to all bank holding companies and established the
two-tiered "closely related/public interest" criteria for Board approval of
nonbanking activities under section 4(c)(8). Again, it was absolutely clear
that the maintenance of the traditional "banking/nonbanking" separation
was a paramount consideration in the passage of the legislation.4 '
The courts have confirmed that, through the enactment of the BHC Act,
37. See, e.g., National Currency Act of 1864, ch. 106, § 8, 13 Stat. 99, 101; National
Banking Act of 1863, ch. 58, § 11, 12 Stat. 665, 668.
38. H.R. REP. No. 609, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1955), reprinted in 1956 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2482. "Most States restrict banks to the banking business and forbid
banks to engage in or control nonbanking businesses." Id at 7 "Historically, National
banks and State banks. . . have been prohibited from investing in the stock of any corpora-
tion and their investments are limited to investment securities of a debt character, that is,
notes, bonds, or debentures which do not represent an equity ownership." Id
39. See HOUSE COMMITTEE ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, 91ST CONG., IST SESS., RE-
PORT ON THE GROWTH OF UNREGISTERED BANK HOLDING COMPANIES--PROBLEMS AND
PROSPECTS (Comm. Print 1969).
40. Pub. L. No. 91-607, 84 Stat. 1760 (1970).
41. Id," see Bank Holding Company Act Amendments, Hearings Before the House Comm.
on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 91, 93 (1969) (statement of Hon. Richard W.
McLaren, Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust); H.R. RP. No. 387, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. 3, 15, 23 (1969); 115 CONG. REc. 10,494 (1969) (remarks of Rep. Bennett); id at 10,495
(remarks of Rep. Hanna); id at 10,495-500, 505 (remarks of Rep. Patman); id at 10,506
(remarks of Rep. Moorhead); id at 10,512 (remarks of Rep. Mink); id at 10,513 (remarks of
Rep. Montgomery); id at 10,545 (remarks of Rep. Patman); id at 10,556 (remarks of Rep.
[Vol. 33:163
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Congress sought to insulate banking from nonbanking activities. An ex-
ception existed, however, where the nonbanking activities bore a close re-
lationship to banking and could be performed by banks in ways that
afforded the public particular benefits.42 The Board's own regulations ac-
knowledge that a "bank holding company may engage, or retain or ac-
quire an interest in a company that engages, solely in one or more of the
activities [enumerated in Regulation .]"'I In the context of its recently
proposed repromulgation of Regulation Y, the Board has also declared
that:
Section 4 of the BHC Act embodies one of the primary pur-
poses of the BHC Act, the separation of banking and commerce,
by limiting the nonbanking activities in which a bank holding
company and its subsidiaries may engage and by prohibiting the
acquisition of shares in nonbanking entities unless such acquisi-
tions are specifically permitted under one of the exceptions to the
section.44
In addition, the Board proclaimed that the BHC Act prohibits "a bank
holding company and its subsidiaries [from] engag[ing] in any activity other
than those of banking or managing or controlling banks or activities other-
wise [deemed to be] permissible under the BHC Act, and may not acquire
voting securities of a company engaged in impermissible activities. '45
Section 2(c) of the BHC Act46 defines the term "subsidiary" to mean
"any company" with 25% or more of its shares directly or indirectly owned
or controlled by a bank holding company. A "subsidiary" may also mean
any company in which a bank holding company controls the election of a
majority of directors or otherwise has a controlling influence over the mak-
ing of policies. 47 The term "company," is broadly defined in section 2(b)
St. Germain); id at 10,558 (remarks of Rep. Matsunage); S. REP. No. 1084, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 3, 13 (1970).
42. See Connecticut Bankers Ass'n v. Board of Gov., 627 F.2d 245, 249-50 (D.C. Cir.
1980); Independent Ins. Agents v. Board of Gov., 658 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1981); S. REP. No.
1095, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 2 (1955); S. REP. No. 1084, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1970); H.R.
REP. No. 1747, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) (conference report).
43. 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a) (1983) (emphasis added).
44. 48 Fed. Reg. 23,528 (1983) (emphasis added). The definition of the term "subsidi-
ary" contained in section 2(d) of the BHC Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1841(d), does not distinguish
between banking and nonbanking subsidiaries. Accordingly, the term "subsidiary" standing
alone must be taken to include both banking and nonbanking subsidiaries.
45. 48 Fed. Reg. 23, 528 (1983) (emphasis added).
46. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(d) (1982).
47. But see Cameron Financial Corp. v. Board of Gov., 497 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1974)
(bank holding company banking subsidiary was determined not to be a "subsidiary" for
purposes of the limited grandfather privileges accorded by § 4(a)(2) of the BHC Act).
Under the regulatory scheme of the BHC Act, Congress established that the Federal Re-
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of the BHC Act,48 as "any corporation, partnership, business trust, associa-
tion, or similar organization." With respect to its recent repromulgation of
a portion of its Regulation Y, the Board defined "company" as including
"any bank, corporation, general or limited partnership, association or simi-
lar organization. . . ."'I Elsewhere, the term "subsidiary" has also been
defined as including any "bank or company that is controlled by another
company or person . ."so
Congress, the Board, and the courts, therefore, have all declared that the
overriding objective of the BHC Act is to prohibit bank holding companies
from engaging in nonbanking activities except in those instances where
nonbanking activities, in the words of the Board, "are specifically permit-
ted under one of the exemptions to [the BHC Act]."'
V. THE LANGUAGE OF THE BHC ACT
A. Section 4(a)(1) of the BHC Act
Section 4(a)(1) of the BHC Act, clearly states that no bank holding com-
pany may "acquire direct or indirect ownership or control of any voting
shares of any company which is not a bank ... ."" Section 2(b) of the
BHC Act, defines "company" to mean "any corporation, partnership, busi-
ness trust, association, or similar organization. . . ."I' Any bank holding
company proposal to undertake otherwise prohibited insurance activities
through one or more subsidiaries of a South Dakota bank necessarily
serve Board is the primary supervisory authority over bank holding companies and their
nonbanking subsidiaries. Under the Act, the Comptroller of the Currency is the primary
supervisory authority over the national and state branch components of national bank hold-
ing companies. Both the various state bank regulators and the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) are the primary supervisory authorities for state banks, including those
state banks that are insured through the FDIC. See, e.g., 115 CONG. REC. 32,900 (1969)
(remarks of Rep. Stanton); 116 CONG. REc. 32,107 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Packwood). In
addition, the BHC Act established limits on the activities of bank holding companies and
empowered the Federal Reserve Board to enforce those limits. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1844(b)
(1982) ("The Board is authorized to issue such regulations and orders as may be necessary to
enable it to administer and carry out the purposes of [the BHC Act] and prevent evasions
thereof."); Board of Gov. v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 59-60 n.25 (1981) (Supreme
Court approved the "imposition of restrictions on banks [that] prevented bank holding com-
panies. . . from evading the restrictions [of Regulation Y] by allowing subsidiary banks to
perform the restricted activities." (emphasis added)).
48. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(b) (1982).
49. 49 Fed. Reg. 818 (1983) (§ 225.2(c)) (emphasis added).
50. Id at 819 (emphasis added).
51. 48 Fed. Reg. 23,528 (1983).
52. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(1) (1982) (emphasis added).
53. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-511, § 2(b), 70 Stat. 133 (1956)
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1841(b) (1982)).
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would mean that such holding company would engage in activities prohib-
ited by the BHC Act through acquisition of "indirect ownership or control
of. . . voting shares of [insurance] compan[ies] which [by definition are]
not. . . bank[s]." '54 Any such proposal, therefore, would appear to contra-
vene theplain language of section 4(a)(1) of the BHC Act.
B. Section 4(a)(2) of the BHC Act
Section 4(a)(2) of the BHC Act refines section 4(a)(1) by expressly for-
bidding bank holding companies to
retain direct or indirect ownership or control of any voting shares
of any company which is not a bank or bank holding company or
engage [by any means] in any activities other than (a) those of
banking or managing or controlling banks . . , and (b) those
[activities] permitted under [section 4(c)(8)] subject to all the con-
ditions specified in [that section] . . ..
Section 4(c)(8) of the BHC Act, in turn, excepts from the general pro-
scription against bank holding company ownership of nonbanking shares,
"shares of any company [which, by definition, includes a bank] the activi-
ties of which the Board. . . has determined to be closely related to bank-
ing or managing or controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto."56
Section 4(c)(8) goes on expressly to exclude most insurance activities from
any universe of activities that might be found to be "closely related" to
54. It should be noted that, under the Banking Affiliates Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-
320, § 410, 80 Stat. 241 (codified at 12 U.S.C.A. § 371(c) (1982)), a majority-owned subsidi-
ary of a bank that itself is a subsidiary of a bank holding company is typically not seen as an
"affiliate" of the bank holding company. As a result, it has been argued that subsidiaries of
state banks that, in turn, are subsidiaries of holding companies are somehow not reached by
the "indirect" langugage of § 4(a)(1). Nevertheless, the BHC Act and the Banking Affiliates
Act are different statutes calculated to achieve wholly different aims and, for that reason, the
extrapolation suggested is unjustified. Moreover, engaging in unlimited insurance activities
through holding company state banks either directly or through subsidiaries would severely
undercut the Banking Affliates Act, a statute that attempts to mitigate the natural competi-
tive advantage of bank holding companies by requiring their intrasystem loans to be made
at arm's length so not to compromise unduly the safety and soundness of the affiliated banks
making the loans. If state banks were permitted to engage in insurance operations through
state-bank affiliates, those bank affilates could make favored loans to their own insurance
organization, which insurance organizations would technically not be affiliates for purposes
of the Bank Affiliates Act.
55. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(2) (1982). It is important to emphasize that the plain language
of § 4(a)(2) makes a distinction between banking and nonbanking activities that are "closely
related" to banking. As a result, the restrictions embodied in § 4(a)(1) reach insurance activ-
ities that are conducted as part of a bank itself (perhaps through a separate "division") just
as directly as they reach insurance activities conducted as separate subsidiaries of banking
subsidiaries.
56. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(4)(c)(8) (1982).
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banking.57
Proponents of the state-bank loophole theory argued that applications to
acquire South Dakota banks (albeit banks through which wide ranging
insurance operations would be conducted) are simple bank applications
under section 3(a)(3) of the BHC Act. They contended that these applica-
tions are not reached by the first operative clause of section 4(a)(2) quoted
above. Proponents further argued that the word "indirect" in the first op-
erative clause modifies "ownership or control" found in the same clause
and not "engage" found in the second operative clause. Accordingly, they
concluded that section 4(a)(2) does not in fact prohibit indirect engagement
in activities other than "banking or managing or controlling banks" or ac-
tivities permissible under the principal nonbanking exception of the Act,
section 4(c)(8).
This reading of section 4(a)(2) is unduly narrow. First, if a bank holding
company sought to conduct insurance operations through one or more sep-
arate subsidiaries of a state-bank affiliate, it is apparent that such a bank
holding company would "own or control . . . voting shares of [an insur-
ance] company which [by definition] is not a bank"5 8 in direct violation of
section 4(a)(l) of the BHC Act.
Moreover, the contentions that the prohibition against engagement in
offending nonbanking activities in the second operative clause of section
4(a)(2) applies only to bank holding companies as discrete corporate enti-
ties and to their nonbanking subsidiaries is equally implausible. Both of
the operative clauses quoted from secton 4(a)(2) modify the term "bank
holding company." Furthermore, "bank holding company" can have only
one of two possible meanings: a discrete corporate entity or a bank hold-
ing company system including all of its bank and nonbank components. If
the term were given its first possible meaning, then the prohibition against
participation in nonbanking activities in the second quoted clause of sec-
tion 4(a)(2) would not apply even to the holding company's nonbanking
subsidiaries. This reading would produce such a loophole in the BHC
Act's nonbanking prohibitions that the BHC Act thereafter would be ren-
dered essentially meaningless. The only other possible construction of sec-
tion 4(a)(2) is that the term "bank holding company" means the entire
holding company system and that the nonbanking limitations imposed by
section 4(a)(2) apply to bank holding companies themselves and to each
bank and nonbank element in the holding company system. The second
reading, of course, is the only one that produces a result that is consistent
57. Id.
58. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(a)(1) (1982).
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with the congressional intent that banking activities remain separate from
nonbanking enterprises.
The most persuasive reading of section 4(a)(2) therefore is this: a bank
holding company may not "retain direct or indirect ownership or control
of any voting shares of any company which is not a bank or bank holding
company. . ." Neither may a bank holding company "engage [by any
means] in any activities other than (A) those of banking or of managing or
controlling banks . . .and (B) those permitted under [section 4(c)(8)]
"60
Beyond the plain language of section 4(a)(2) itself, such a conclusion is
compelled by yet another provision, section 4(c)(12) of the BHC Act. 6 ,
Congress added section 4(c)(12) to the BHC Act in 1970 in order to pro-
vide the Board with specific guidance in handling divestitures that were
necessitated by an extension of the BHC Act's nonbanking prohibitions
from just multiple to single bank holding companies as well. 62 Section
4(c)(12) states that the section 4's nonbanking prohibitions do not apply to
any shares retained or activities conducted by a bank holding company or
a subsidiary covered by the BHC Act by virtue of the 1970 amendments, as
long as within the time limitations prescribed in section 4(a)(2), the com-
pany in question "(i) ceases to be a bank holding company [by selling off
its bank], or (ii) ceases to retain direct or indirect ownership or control of
those shares and to engage in those activities not authorized under this
section ....,63 In an effort to clarify its intent in enacting section
4(c)(12), Congress explained:
[T]he divestiture period will effect [sic] two types of companies.
The first type will be the company which will divest its bank and
[thereby] cease[s] to be a bank holding company. The second
type of company is that which will be required to divest a non-
banking subsidiary or cease to engage in a nonbanking activity in
order to comply with the grandfather clause, or in order to bring
its entire operation under all provisions of the Bank Holding
Company Act.'
By its terms, therefore, section 4(c)(12) clearly states that after the time
limitations prescribed by section 4(a)(2), no bank holding company may,
either directly or through any subsidiary of any type, (i) own the shares of
59. Id
60. See 48 Fed. Reg. 23,528 (1983); see also supra note 44 and accompanying text.
61. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(12) (1982).
62. Id The 1970 amendments included single bank holding companies along with the
multiple bank holding companies that were included prior to 1970.
63. Id
64. S. REP. No. 1084, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8 (1970) (emphasis added).
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an entity that a bank holding company is prohibited from owning by sec-
tions 4(a)(1), 4(a)(2), and 4(c)(8), or (ii) engage by whatever means in any
activity that is not authorized under some provision of section 4.
C Section 4(c)(5) of the BHC Act
The proponents of the state-bank loophole theory relied, in the main,
upon section 225.4(e)(2) of the Board's Regulation Y as the principal au-
thority supporting their contention that bank holding companies can use
state banks to undertake otherwise prohibited nonbanking activities." In
pertinent part, section 225.4(e)(2) authorizes bank holding companies,
through state-bank subsidiaries, to engage in any activities "in which the
parent bank may engage, at locations at which the bank may engage in the
activity, and subject to the same limitations as if the bank were engaged in
the activity directly."66 Under section 225.4(e)(2), the Board some years
ago approved applications by Piedmont Carolina Financial Services, Inc.
and American Bancorp, Inc. to retain general insurance agency operations
conducted by state banks that later became affiliated with bank holding
companies.67
The statutory authority underlying section 225.4(e) is section 4(c)(5)
which, despite the nonbanking limitations of the BHC Act, allows a bank
holding company to own "any shares which are of the kinds and amounts
eligible for investment by national banking associations under the provi-
sions of [12 U.S.C. § 24]."' 68 Section 24 enumerates those activities that
may be undertaken by national banks and thereby limits those activities
essentially to accepting deposits, making loans, and investing in a narrow
spectrum of government securities." As a result, the authority conferred
65. 12 C.F.R. §225.4(e)(2) (1983). The Board has proposed to repromulgate
§ 225.4(e)(2) in § 225.22(d) of its proposed revised Regulation Y. 48 Fed. Reg. 23,538
(1983). In the context of its January 1984 statement on the South Dakota bank applications,
the Board deferred for the time being further action on § 225.4(e). See FRB Release, supra
note 5, at 2.
66. When the Board first promulgated § 225.4(e)(2), it was well aware of the potential
distortion it could inflict upon the nonbanking restrictions of the BHC Act. In the release
that accompanying the final rule, the Board said that its decision not to apply certain restric-
tions to the subsidiaries of state-chartered banks "at this time" was made because of the
"absence of evidence that acquisitions by holding company banks are resulting in evasions
of the purposes of the Act." 36 Fed. Reg. 9292 (1971).
67. Piedmont Carolina Financial Serv., Inc., 59 Fed. Res. Bull. 766 (1973); American
Bancorp, Inc., 39 Fed. Reg. 22,468 (1974).
68. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(5) (1982).
69. Id. at § 24; see 48 Fed. Reg. 23,529 (1983). The only insurance activities that have
been determined to be permissible for national banks under § 24 are those activities where
the national banks have been acting as agents and, more recently, underwriters in the sale of
credit life and credit disability insurance. See Independent Bankers Ass'n v. Heimann, 613
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on bank holding companies by section 4(c)(5) appears to be much more
limited than section 225.4(e)(2) suggests.7"
Shortly after the enactment of the BHC Act in 1956, the Board was
asked to determine whether shares of a nonbanking company, which were
acquired by a banking subsidiary of a holding company, were exempt
from the divestment requirements of the BHC Act under section 4(c)(5).
The Board responded:
While the exemption specifically refers only to shares held or
acquired by the bank holding company, the prohibition of the act
against retention of nonbanking interests applies to indirect as
well as direct ownership of shares of a nonbanking company,
and, in the absence of a clear mandate to the contrary, any excep-
tion to this prohibition should be given equal breadth with the
prohibition. Any other interpretation would lead to unwarranted
results.7
More importantly, the Board went on to state:
Although certain of the other exemptions in Section 4(c) of the
act specifically refer to shares held or acquired by banking sub-
sidiaries, an analysis of those exemptions suggests that such spe-
cific reference to banking subsidiaries was for the purpose of
excluding nonbanking subsidiaries from such exemptions, rather
than for the purpose of providing an inclusionary emphasis on
banking subsidiaries.72
Reflected in the Board's characterization of section 4(c)(5) is its long
acceptance of the fact that this section's nonbanking restrictions apply to
all nonbanking activities-whether those activities are conducted directly
by the bank holding company, or through a national-bank, or nonbank
subsidiary. The nonbanking restrictions, therefore, are imposed upon the
activities of all bank holding companies, irrespective of any corporate
machinations that may occur within a particular bank holding company
system.
The Board recently reconfirmed the significance of the nonbanking re-
strictions of the BHC Act in its proposed repromulgation of Regulation
y. 73 Specifically, the Board explained that the requirement of section
F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 823 (1980); OCC Release, FED. BANKING
L. REP. (CCH) § 99,806 (Dec. 23, 1983).
70. But see Fed. Res. Bd. Staff Opinion 4-599 (April 2, 1981); Fed. Reg. Bd. Staff Opin-
ion 4-591 (Jan. 12, 1982).
71. 12 C.F.R. § 225.101(c) (1983).
72. 12 C.F.R. § 225.101(d) (1983).
73. See 48 Fed. Reg. 23,528 (1983) (§ 225.21). For the recent repromulgation of Regu-
lation Y, see 49 Fed. Reg. 806 (1984).
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4(c)(5), that investments be made "explicitly eligible" by federal statute for
investment by national banks, "was adopted by the Board in 1971 to pre-
vent [the section] from being used to circumvent the requirements of Sec-
tion 4(c)(8). ' 74
After the enactment of the South Dakota bank insurance legislation, the
Board began to give indications that in the current environment, continua-
tion of section 225.4(e)(2) may be ill-advised. In apparent reference to sec-
tion 225.4(e)(2) and to what is contemplated by proposed section
225.22(d)(2), Board Chairman Paul A. Volcker recently told the Senate
Banking Committee:
The Federal Reserve, in administering the Bank Holding
Company Act, has for years maintained a policy of permitting
state-chartered bank affiliates of bank holding companies to en-
gage in any activity such a bank is permitted to engage in under
its State charter. This policy has been premised upon the view
that a certain degree of experimentation and difference in ap-
proach among the states is a legitimate and desirable aspect of
our dual banking system, and that differences in powers allowed
by states would be acceptable to the extent they would not domi-
nate established congressional policy. In view of current devel-
opments, I believe that policy should be reviewed to consider
whether the result is to undercut the federal standards set forth in
the Bank Holding Company Act. .. .
Regardless of the interpretation that the Board may from time to time
give to section 225.4(e)(2), it is unlawful for any administrative agency to
promulgate a rule or pursue a "policy" that legitimizes activities that are
clearly prohibited by a statute that the agency is duty bound to enforce.76
It is clear, therefore, that the underlying rationale of section 4(c)(5), which
the Board relied upon as a basis for section 225.4(e)(2) and for proposed
section 225.22(d)(2), provides no grounds whatsoever for allowing bank
holding companies to pursue prohibited activities through their state-bank
subsidiaries. This is especially true with respect to insurance because it is
the only activity that Congress has expressly prohibited bank holding com-
panies to undertake." Even assuming that the language of section 225.4(e)
was justifiable in 1956, when it was first promulgated as a "policy," under
74. See id.
75. Statement of Paul A. Volcker, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Re-
serve System, before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 69
Fed. Res. Bull. 356, 358 (1983).
76. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
77. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. See also Saxon v. Georgia Ass'n of In-
dependent Ins. Agents, 399 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1968) (national banks are prohibited under
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current circumstances its breadth is not defensible, and thus, it must be
construed in a way that conforms with the express language of the en-
abling provision of the BHC Act, section 4(c)(5).
D. Section 4(c) of the BHC Act
Until last year, section 4(c)(8) permitted bank holding companies to own
or acquire "shares of any company the activities of which the Board...
has determined . . . to be so closely related to banking or managing or
controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto. . ."" On October
15, 1982, Congress augmented the language of section 4(c)(8) through its
enactment of section 601 of the Garn-St Germain Act.7 9 That provision
amended section 4(c)(8) by expressly stating that "for purposes of this sub-
section it is not closely related to banking or managing or controlling
banks for a bank holding company to provide insurance as a principal,
agent, or broker .... ""
By its express terms, section 601 of Garn-St Germain applied the insur-
ance prohibitions to every entity that is a "bank holding company." As in
the case of section 4(a)(2), "bank holding company" is susceptible to only
two possible meanings-a discrete corporate entity or an entire holding
company system.8 Any suggestions that Congress intended the first possi-
bility would mean that the insurance prohibitions in section 601 would not
apply to the nonbanking subsidiaries of holding companies, rendering sec-
tion 4(a)(2) essentially meaningless. Obviously this was not Congress' in-
tent. The only other alternative, therefore, is to construe "bank holding
company" to include bank holding company systems, complete with all of
their banking and nonbanking components.
Not only is this construction the only one that makes any sense given the
12 U.S.C. §§ 24 & 92 from undertaking any property and casualty insurance activities other
than insurance agency activities in small towns).
78. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(4)(C)(8) (1982). See also supra notes 17, 18 and accompany-
ing text.
79. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
80. The exemptions to the general prohibition contained in § 601 of Garn-St Germain
permit bank holding companies, subject to continued compliance with the "public benefits"
test of § 4(c)(8), to offer (i) credit life and credit disability insurance and involuntary unem-
ployment insurance as underwriter or agent; (ii) credit property insurance (within certain
limitations); (iii) insurance in towns having 5,000 or fewer inhabitants or where there exist
inadequate insurance agency facilities; (iv) any insurance sold prior to May 1, 1982, subject
to limited product line and geographical expansion; (v) insurance activities performed by
managing general agents (with certain product-line limitations); (vi) any insurance sold by a
bank holding company which has total system assets of $50,000,000 or less; and (vii) insur-
ance agency activities undertaken prior to 1971. See 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8) (1982).
81. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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avowed purposes of the BHC Act, it is also the only one that comports
with the legislative history of the Garn St Germain Act.82 When the defi-
nition of "subsidiary" contained in section 2(d) of the BHC Act is applied,
the best construction of the applicability of the insurance proscription con-
tained in section 601 of Garn-St Germain is that the limitations of the
insurance prohibition affect every bank holding company and every entity
controlled by a bank holding company, whether such entities are banks,
nonbanks, national banks or state banks.
It seems obvious that section 225.4(e)(2) of the Board's Regulation Y,
the principal authority relied upon by proponents of the state-bank loop-
hole theory, is fundamentally at odds not only with the plain language of
section 601 of the BHC Act but also with Congress' express intent. As
such, section 225.4(e)(2) is in fundamental disharmony with the overall
purposes of the BHC Act and with the express language of both section
4(c)(5) and section 4(c)(8). In the context of Garn-St Germain, therefore,
section 225.4(e)(2) can have no viability whatsoever.
83
E. Section 7 of the BHC Act
Another factor that supports the conclusion that bank holding compa-
nies may not be authorized to engage through state-bank affiliates in any
activity proscribed for the holding company and its nonbanking subsidiar-
ies is section 7 of the BHC Act. That section provides simply that: "The
enactment by the Congress of this [Act] shall not be construed as prevent-
82. H.R. REP. No. 899, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 91 (1982) (conference report) (emphasis
added). The Conference Report associated with H.R. REP. No. 6267 (the Conference Com-
mittee's substitute for the original legislation contained in S. 2879) states: "The Senate
amendment generally prohibits bank holding companies and their subsidiaries from provid-
ing insurance, including property and casualty insurance products, as a principal, agent, or
broker, with six specific exceptions enumerated in the Title." H.R. REP. No. 6267, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); see S. REP. No. 536, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 36, 37 (1982) (defines the
problems of separating the insurance activities of a "bank holding company" from "bank
holding companies and their subsidiaries").
83. Following the enactment of§ 601 of Garn-St Germain, the Board sent a letter to the
various reserve banks making clear that § 601 generally restricted the expansion of the prop-
erty and casualty insurance activities of bank holding companies. Additionally, the Board's
letter emphasized that the enactment of § 601 "did not relieve bank holding companies of
the obligation to file an application to engage in insurance activities and did not relieve the
system of the responsibility to make the determinations that: 1) proposed activities are
'closely related' to banking, and 2) performance of the proposed activity by an applicant
would result in net public benefits." See Letter dated Feb. 28, 1983, from Federal Reserve
Board Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation to all Federal Reserve Banks, 4
FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH) § 43,082 (1983). It hardly seems likely that the Board issued
such instructions while under the supposition that they could legitimately be avoided
through any mechanism that might be provided in § 225.4(e)(2) of Regulation Y.
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ing any State from exercising such powers and jurisdiction which it now
has or may hereinafter have with respect to banks, bank holding compa-
nies, and subsidiaries thereof." 4 Moreover, the Supreme Court has ex-
plained the meaning of the section as follows:
[Section 7] of the Act does reserve to the States a general power
to enact regulations applicable to bank holding companies. This
section was intended to preserve existing state regulations of
bank holding companies, even if they were more restrictive than
federal law. . . .Congress' concern was to define the extent of
the federal legislation's pre-emptive effect on state law. In re-
sponse to criticisms of the provision on the ground that it might
be interpreted to expand state authority, one Committee Report
stated that it was intended "to preserve to the States those powers
which they now have in our dual banking system," yet "to make
it clear that a State could not enact legislation inconsistent with
the [Act] and therefore nullify its effect."85
Further reference to the Senate Report upon which the Supreme Court
relied makes it absolutely clear that state law cannot be used as a vehicle
by which bank holding companies may evade the restrictions of section 4
of the BHC Act:
A great deal of concern has been expressed that section 7 of the
bill as reported by the committee granted new authority and
powers to States . . . . The language added by the committee
...provided that States in the exercise of their jurisdiction and
powers over banks and bank holding companies could impose
'no less onerous' restrictions than were provided in the bill. The
intent of the committee was to make it clear that a State could not
enact legislation inconsistent with the bill and therefore nullify its
effect. In view of the fact that the meaning of the no less onerous
clause has apparently been misconstrued by some persons, the
committee agreed to strike the clause and thus return to the lan-
guage of the comparable section of H.R. 6227. However, your
committee reiterates its view that section 7 in no waypermits States
to exercise such powers and jurisdiction in a manner inconsistent
with this proposed legislation. 86
84. 12 U.S.C. § 1846 (1982).
85. Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 48-49 (1980). See S. REP. No. 1095,
84th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, pt. 1, 5 (1956).
86. S. REP. No. 1095, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 5 (1956) (emphasis added). See id.,
pt. 1 ("[Ejach State may ... be more severe on banking holding companies" than required
by federal law); id pt. 2; ("[T]here is a reservation of the rights of any State [to regulate]
banks, bank holding companies, and the subsidiaries thereof in a manner more restrictive,
than the provisions of this bill") (emphasis added).
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Therefore, a state may prohibit certain conduct otherwise permitted
under the BHC Act. Indeed, the BHC Act may permit state legislatures to
authorize nonaffiliated or "free standing" state banks within their borders
to engage in activities such as the sale of insurance, subject to any limita-
tions that may be imposed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Act.8 7 It may
not, however, obviate or render futile the express prohibition against such
activities set forth in the BHC Act, or any other federal law.
Thus, even if particular state laws expressly empower state banks to en-
gage in activities prohibited by the BHC Act, a state bank that is a part of a
bank holding company system cannot lawfully exercise those powers
under the BHC Act. To say otherwise is to argue that Congress intended
the BHC Act to be an incipient nullity-a law that establishes boundaries
that are subject to the possibility of instantaneous repeal through the ac-
tions of one or more states. Congress specifically considered and expressly
rejected such a notion.88 Construing the statute in this manner would turn
the carefully constructed pyramid of federal banking regulation that is re-
flected in the BHC Act and many other statutes on its point, thereby assur-
ing that structure's eventual collapse.
VI. CONCLUSION
A statutory separation between banking and commerce has been main-
tained in the laws of this nation, almost without interruption, since the
advent of the national banking system. On repeated occasions, Congress
has acted to reinvigorate that separation through pronouncements that the
separation between banking and commerce exists and, in Congress' view,
must be maintained as an essential ingredient of a sound banking system.
Nevertheless, the major bank holding companies, in their effort to conduct
nonbanking activities through their state-bank affiliates, have attempted to
circumvent the long-standing separation between banking and commerce.
In response to this attempt, the Federal Reserve Board expressed its
"tentative judgment" on January 5, 1984, that it could not lawfully ap-
prove major bank holding companies' South Dakota bank applications un-
til "further consideration by Congress." In its announcement, the Federal
Reserve Board confirmed that state-bank affiliates of bank holding compa-
nies may not be used to perform nonbanking activities that are prohibited
under federal banking law. The Board also confirmed that if the federal
87. See 12 U.S.C. § 1816 (1982) (where one of the factors to be considered in the issu-
ance of deposit insurance is whether the bank's "corporate powers are consistent with the
purposes of the [Federal Deposit Insurance Act].").
88. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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banking laws are to be amended, such amendments must be accomplished
in an integrated and coherent manner by Congress and not in a chaotic
and piecemeal fashion by the states. The Board's "tentative" decision,
therefore, when viewed in conjunction with its earlier action expanding the
definition of the term "bank," is an important administrative step that pro-
motes uniformity in the federal banking laws.

